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Abstract
This paper studies the link between migration, remittances and productive assets
accumulation for a panel of poor rural households in Mexico over the period 1997-
2006. In a context of financial markets imperfections, migration may act as a
substitute for imperfect credit and insurance provision (through remittances from
migrants) and, thus, exert a positive effect on investment. However, it may well be
the case that remittances are channelled towards increasing consumption and leisure
goods. Exploiting within family variation and an instrumental variable strategy, we
show that migration indeed accelerates productive assets accumulation. Moreover,
when we look at the effect of migration on consumption of non-productive assets
(durable goods), we find instead a negative effect. Our results then suggest that
poor rural families resort to migration as a way to mitigate constraints that prevent
them from investing in productive assets.
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1 Introduction
The migration of labor out of agriculture was a fundamental issue in the early models
of development economics (Lewis, 1954; Sen 1966; Harris and Todaro, 1970; see Ghatak,
Levine and Wheatly Price, 1996, for an excellent survey). In these models, the agricul-
tural sector is typically characterized by stagnation and unproductive labor, while the
urban industrial sector is the one that contributes to economic development. The above
literature has then seen migration from the rural to the urban sector as a way out of
poverty. However, some recent work has argued for a positive role of migration also in
the rural sector itself. In general, migration and remittances may alleviate credit and
productive constraints (Rozelle, Taylor and DeBrauw, 1999). For instance, Stark (1991)
hypothesizes that migrants may play the role of financial intermediaries, enabling rural
households to overcome credit constraints and missing insurance markets. Furthermore,
migration mitigates the impact of agricultural income shocks by allowing families to re-
locate labor to the cities when that is needed (Lucas and Stark, 1985). In fact, it is often
the case that individuals in a household commonly pool resources to finance migration of
one of their members who later on repays this investment by remitting a part of his/her
income back to the family. Thus, households tend to spread their labor force over different
geographic markets in order to better pool risks. In addition, consistent with the previous
observations, Glytsos (1993) and Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) provide evidence that
remittances tend to particularly foster growth in countries with less developed financial
systems by helping overcome liquidity constraints.
The research question addressed in this paper is to assess the effect of migration on the
process of asset accumulation at a microeconomic level using household data from poor
rural areas in Mexico. We differentiate by the types of assets that are accumulated, i.e.
productive vs. non-productive assets, and we focus on the role played by remittances to
help assets accumulation. The accumulation of assets by rural households plays a crucial
role in the analysis of rural poverty and it is an under-explored area of the migration-
welfare links operating through remittances from migrants.
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In Mexico, rural areas have a very high incidence of deprivation in terms of access to
services and perceived well-being. In this context, migration may exert a positive effect
on asset accumulation and lift families permanently out of poverty in an overall deprived
context. However, it may well be the case that the impact is not positive if accumulation
is biased towards leisure goods, which may increase current welfare of the migrant families
but decrease their dynamic prospects. Using a unique panel database for Mexican rural
households, the econometric results presented in this paper show that migration indeed
opens up a possibility for poor households to accelerate asset accumulation, particularly
in productive assets. We deploy an instrumental variable strategy in order to cope with
endogeneity issues.
We frame the empirical results within a two-period model of investment and migration
decisions of credit constrained rural households. The model shows that migration affects
investment only for moderately poor households, while it leads to increasing consumption
for the very poor and relatively rich households. Moreover, the model makes it explicit
that household characteristics need to be controlled for in the empirical setting in order
to obtain unbiased results of the effect of migration on investment. More precisely, the
model shows that migration decisions correlate with household-specific characteristics that
also influence migration and investment choices. Controlling for these household-specific
characteristics is then crucial for insulating the effect of sending out a migrant on the
investment behavior of those who remain at the rural village. Interestingly, the predicted
bias in the theoretical model goes in the same direction as that in our empirical results.
Migration and remittances have been largely studied in the microeconometric liter-
ature with respect to the accumulation of human capital. As argued in Hanson and
Woodruff (2003) the additional income from remittances may allow children to delay
entering the work force. However, it may also alter the family structure, increasing child-
rearing responsibilities and, therefore, having a negative consequence on household wel-
fare. Moreover, as argued in Acosta (2006), it can be expected that recipient families
will expand their consumption of leisure (and reduce labor supply) and that recipient
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families may increase their dependence on external transfers. Nevertheless, evidence on
the accumulation of physical assets is still missing in this literature and this paper intends
to fill this gap.
The topic addressed here is also related to the effect of credit constraints in the urban
informal sector. Woodruff (2001) found a positive impact of remittances in Mexico (they
are shown to be responsible for almost 20% of the capital invested). In the same vein,
Mesnard and Ravaillon (2002) and Mesnard (2004) studied the temporary migration de-
cision of workers who are credit constrained in Tunisia and evaluates the extent to which
liquidity constraints affect self-employment decisions of returned migrants. There is also
some evidence on this issue for the case of internal migration in India (Banerjee and Bucci,
1994). Our paper extends these results to rural poor households.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model that accounts for migra-
tion and investment decisions. Section 3 describes the unique dataset used to construct
the panel of rural households. Section 4 presents the methodology used for constructing
the asset indexes. Section 5 presents some descriptive statistics. Section 6 carries the
econometric analysis showing the effect of migration on asset accumulation. Section 7
concludes.
2 Migration and investment decisions in a two-period
maximization problem
This section proposes a very simple model to illustrate how relatively poor families may
resort to migration as a response to credit constraints that prevent them from investing
in productive assets. In particular, the model aims to show that poor families may, under
certain conditions, choose to send migrants so as to use their remittances to overcome
credit constraints.
We will first start with a two-period model in which the possibility of sending migrants
is excluded. This will set a benchmark upon which we can then compare the optimal
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behavior of families when they have the chance to send a migrant to a richer region or
city, from whom they may receive positive remittances.
2.1 No-migration regime
There is a continuum of rural families (or households) i ∈ I who live for two periods,
t = {1, 2}. At the beginning of each period t each family i receives an amount of income
equal to yt,i, where yt,i is the realisation of a random variable uniformly distributed (and
independently distributed across families) along the interval [1, y], where y > 1. We
assume that y1,i = y2,i = yi; that is, income realizations are persistent within families.
More broadly speaking, we could also interpret the variable yi as capturing the effect of
family specific productive assets (for example, different families may own plots of land
that differ in terms of their level of fertility); in the econometric terminology used below,
the variable yi captures family-specific fixed-effects.
Families derive log-utility from consumption at the end of each period t and we assume
no discount factor is applied on future consumption.1 All families are credit-constrained,
and then, they cannot increase current consumption by borrowing against future income.
Families, however, have access to a storing technology (with no depreciation), hence they
may transfer present income to the future in case they wish so.
All families have access also to an indivisible investment project (an investment in
productive assets that increases productivity in the future, for example, investing in irri-
gation or buying a new tractor). In particular, in period 1 families can choose whether or
not to invest in a project that requires 1 unit of capital as investment, and yields R > 1
units of income at the end of period 2.
The families’ optimization problem may be approached by noting that it involves two
different issues: first, choosing whether or not to invest in the project at the beginning
1No discounting is just a simplifying assumption, useful for the algebraic derivations. The log-utility
is also mainly for algebraic simplicity, and could be replaced by any other CRRA utility function without
much problem (as we will see below, it is important though that utility displays decreasing absolute risk
aversion).
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of t = 1; second, choosing the optimal consumption flow, conditional on the former
investment decision. We can then solve the problem for family i simply by comparing
the maximum utility achieved in each of the two possible scenarios: (a) investing in the
project; (b) not investing. We denote by ct,i consumption in period t and by s1,i the
amount of income stored from period 1 until period 2.
Case (a): Invest in the project. Family i solves:
max : Ui,I = ln(c1,i) + ln(c2,i) (1)
subject to: c1,i = yi − s1,i − 1,
c2,i = yi + s1,i +R,
s1,i ≥ 0.
It is straightforward to observe that in problem (1) the constraint s1,i ≥ 0 will bind
in the optimum (i.e., families would like to borrow against future income so as to smooth
consumption, but they are not able to do so). Hence, families will set optimally s∗1,i = 0,
implying that: c∗1,i,I = yi−1 and c∗2,i,I = yi+R. As a result, the maximum utility achieved
by a family with income yi that invests in the project is given by:
U∗i,I = ln (yi − 1) + ln (yi +R) . (2)
Case (b): No investment. Family i solves:
max : Ui,NI = ln(c1,i) + ln(c2,i) (3)
subject to: c1,i = yi − s1,i,
c2,i = yi + s1,i,
s1,i ≥ 0.
Since the income flow is identical in both periods and future is not discounted, fam-
ilies will optimally consume the yi in each of the two periods, so as to achieve perfect
consumption smoothing. That is, c∗1,i,NI = c
∗
2,i,NI = yi, which in turn implies s
∗
1,i,NI = 0.
Hence, the utility achieved by a family with income yi that decides not to invest is given
by:
U∗i,NI = ln
(
y2i
)
. (4)
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Finally, families will choose to invest if and only if that allows them to obtain higher
intertemporal utility than not investing. Then, comparing (2) and (4) implies:
I = 1 ⇔ yi > R
R− 1 . (5)
The expression (5) stipulates that only families with (permanent) income larger than
R/(R− 1) will invest in the project. The reason for this is that, in the presence of credit
constraints, given that utility displays decreasing absolute risk aversion, only sufficiently
rich families are willing to give away one unit of consumption in t = 1 in order to be
able to invest and increase consumption t = 2 by R units.2 Henceforth, we assume that
y > R/(R− 1), so that there exist some families who are willing to invest.
2.2 Migration allowed
Assume now that after observing the income realization yi at the beginning of t = 1,
family i could send one of their members to a richer city or region in the first period
(we assume for simplicity only temporary migration). Sending a migrant imposes an
“emotional” cost M > 0, measured in terms of utility.3 Migration is treated as a risky
asset when compared with the risk-free income in the village. The migrant may get a good
job in the region he migrated to, which yields net income υ > 0. Instead, if migrant fails
to find a good job, he receives net income equal to 0. We assume that 1 ≤ υ < 1 + R.4
Furthermore, we suppose that the emotional cost is not too large relative to the potential
gains from migration; in particular, M ≤ ln(R).
2There is no risk in the model. Hence, the DARA property should be simply understood as an
assumption on the degree of concavity of the utility function, which in turn governs the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and therefore how willing agents are to transfer resources across the two periods.
3In the literature this is known as “psychological costs”, and there exists some evidence for intra-
European migration (Molle and van Mourik, 1988). We could also add to the model some pecuniary cost
attached to sending a migrant (i.e. transportation costs), although it is important for our argument that
the expected pecuniary return from sending a migrant is positive.
4The lower bound, υ ≥ 1, essentially says that the good jobs that migrants may find are sufficiently
productive, making migration (possibly) an attractive option. The upper bound, υ < 1 +R, is just posed
to focus only on those cases in which the credit constraint, si ≥ 0, binds in the optimum (as we will see,
υ < 1 +R implies that total family income in t = 1 never exceeds that of t = 2).
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We assume that local networks in the city where migrants move to make it easier for
them to obtain a good job.5 In particular, we postulate that the migrant from family
i will manage to find good job with probability p(ni) = ni, where ni ∈ [0, 1] represents
the ’network density’ that family i has got in the recipient city. We assume that ni is
uniformly distributed along the interval [0, 1] in the population, and that the correlation
between ni and yi in the population equals zero.
From now onwards we denote by U˜∗i the utility achieved by family i if they choose to
send a migrant (whereas, as before, U∗i denotes the utility of family if they do not send a
migrant).
Relatively rich families: Consider family i with network density ni ∈ [0, 1] and income
yi ≥ R/ (R− 1). From the previous analysis, it follows that this family will always invest
in the project. That is, it will invest regardless of whether it chooses to send a migrant
or not, and, in the case they do send a migrant, regardless of whether the migrant finds
a good job or not. As a result, if they do not send a migrant, their utility equals that
written before in (2). On the other hand, if they do send a migrant, their utility is given
by:
U˜∗,richi,I = ni [ln (yi + υ − 1) + ln(yi +R)] + (1− ni) [ln (yi − 1) + ln(yi +R)]−M. (6)
A family with yi ≥ R/ (R− 1) will thus send a migrant if and only if U˜∗,richi,I > U∗i,I , which
in turn leads to:
If yi ≥ R/ (R− 1) , send migrant iff: ni [ln (yi + υ − 1)− ln (yi − 1)] ≥M. (7)
Relatively poor families: Consider now the case of family i with ni ∈ [0, 1] and
yi < R/ (R− 1). From the previous analysis, it follows that such a family will not invest
in the project if, after sending a migrant, this migrant fails to obtain a good job. Nor will
5The role of networks on migration has been extensively studied in the literature (see for instance
Munshi, 2003, and the references therein).
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they invest in the project when they do not send a migrant, as this situation is isomorphic
to the no-migration regime.
The first question to address is then the following: should a family that sent a migrant
invest in the project when the migrant obtains a good job? Consider such a family: the
two expressions below show the utility achieved by the family, first, in the case it invests
in the project and, second, in the case it does not.
U˜∗,poori,I = ni [ln (y + υ − 1) + ln(y +R)] + (1− ni)
[
ln
(
y2i
)]−M, (8)
U˜∗,poori,NI = ni
[
ln
(
yi +
υ
2
)2]
+ (1− ni)
[
ln
(
y2i
)]−M. (9)
Hence, comparing (8) and (9), it follows that families with yi < R/ (R− 1) who send a
migrant will invest in the project, if and only if the migrant finds a good job and the
following condition holds:
yi >
R
R− 1 −
υ
(
R− υ
4
)
R− 1 ≡ ŷ. (10)
Notice that ŷ < R
R−1 . In fact, it may well be that ŷ < 1.
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The second question to deal with is, bearing in mind equations (8) and (9), should a
family with ni ∈ [0, 1] and yi < R/ (R− 1) send a migrant or not? Answering this question
demands comparing U∗i,NI to U˜
∗,poor
i,I for those families with yi ∈
(
ŷ, R
R−1
)
, whereas for those
families whose yi ≤ ŷ we must compare U∗i,NI to U˜∗,poori,NI . We can thus obtain the following
two conditions:
If yi ∈
(
ŷ, R
R−1
)
, send migrant iff: ni [ln (yi + υ − 1) + ln(yi +R)− ln (y2i )] ≥M ;(11)
If yi < ŷ, send migrant iff: ni
[
ln
(
yi +
υ
2
)2 − ln (y2i )] ≥M. (12)
6For example, for any R > 54 , ŷ will necessarily be strictly smaller than 1. To see this, observe from
(10) that υ < 1 +R implies ŷ is strictly decreasing in υ, hence ŷ reaches a maximum at the lower bound
υ = 1. Replacing then υ = 1 into (10) straightforwardly leads to the fact that R > 54 implies ŷ < 1.
More generally, ŷ < 1 whenever R ≥ υ−1 + υ4 . Notice, too, that both a larger R and larger υ make this
last inequality more likely to hold. This is quite intuitive, since the (expected) return from migration
is increasing in R and υ; in the former case indirectly through investment returns, in the latter directly
through earnings.
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Since a larger network, ni, increases the chances the migrant finds a good job (or,
in other words, the expected return from sending a migrant increases with ni), families
with a larger ni will naturally tend to be more prone to send a migrant. The following
proposition states this result more formally.
Proposition 1 There exists a continuous and strictly increasing function n˜(y) : R++ →
R++, such that for all ni ≥ n˜(yi) :
(i) If yi ∈
[
R
R−1 , y
]
, then condition (7) holds.
(ii) If yi ≥ 1 and yi ∈
(
ŷ, R
R−1
)
, then condition (11) holds.
(iii) If yi ≥ 1 and yi ≤ ŷ, then condition (12) holds.
Furthermore, 0 < n˜
(
R
R−1
)
< 1.
Proof. In Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that, for each family i with income yi ∈ [1, y], there exists a
threshold in the network density, n˜(yi), such that if ni ≥ n˜(yi) this family chooses to
send a migrant. The network threshold n˜(y) is strictly increasing in y, implying that a
larger mass of migrants will originate from relatively poor families than from relatively
rich ones. The intuition for this is that the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing
in the level of consumption, while the disutility from migration, M , is constant for any
level of consumption. As a result, poorer families will be more eager to endure the
“emotional” cost M , because their marginal return of migration in terms of (expected)
utility of additional consumption is larger. Notice, finally, that Proposition 1 does not
restrict n˜(yi) ≤ 1 for yi > R/(R − 1). In fact, it may well be the case that none of the
families with yi > R/(R− 1) will send any migrants.
The next step is to study how migration decisions interact with investment decisions.
In particular, we are interested in studying whether families send migrants with the aim
to increase their capacity to invest in the projects. By merging the migration results in
Proposition 1 with the preceding discussion in this section, we can summarize households’
optimal decisions concerning migration and investment in the following corollary.
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Corollary 1
(i) If R ≥ υ−1 + υ
4
. Then ŷ ≤ 1, and:
a) For any y ∈ [ R
R−1 , y
]
: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant. If ni < n˜(y)
and yi = y, family i does not send a migrant. Family i always invests in the project.
b) For any y ∈ [1, R
R−1
)
: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant and invests in
the project if and only if the migrant finds a good job. If ni < n˜(y) and yi = y, family i
does not send a migrant and does not invest in the project.
(ii) If R < υ−1 + υ
4
. Then ŷ > 1, and:
a) For any y ∈ [ R
R−1 , y
]
: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant. If ni < n˜(y)
and yi = y, family i does not send a migrant. Family i always invests in the project.
b) For any y ∈ (ŷ, R
R−1
)
: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant and invests in
the project if and only if the migrant finds a good job. If ni < n˜(y) and yi = y, family i
does not send a migrant and does not invest in the project.
c) For any y ∈ [1, ŷ]: If ni ≥ n˜(y) and yi = y, family i sends a migrant. If ni < n˜(y) and
yi = y, family i does not send a migrant. Family i never invests in the project.
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The results from Corollary 1 can be visually summarized in Figure 1. The key insight
of the corollary can be gleaned from point b), both for cases (i) and (ii) therein. The
result in b) says there exist some families who use migration as a mechanism to mitigate
credit constraints that prevent them from investing in projects that would raise their
intertemporal income. Essentially, those families send a migrant, betting on the chance
that this migrant finds a good job, which would increase their total income in t = 1 and,
thus, puts them in better position to undertake the unit investment that yields R > 1
units of income in t = 2.
2.3 Effect of migration on investment decisions
We now study the effect of migration on families’ investment decisions. The migration
effect results from calculating the difference in investment decisions between migrant and
non-migrant families. First consider E [I|m = 1, y] − E [I|m = 0, y], where I and m
are indicator functions regarding investment and migration decisions, respectively. In
relation to the empirical results in this paper, we refer to this model as fixed-effects
(FE) model, because by conditioning on y we are controlling for the family-specific FE.
Note from Corollary 1 that, for any y ≥ R
R−1 , families choose I = 1 irrespective of their
migration choice; while (in case (ii) of the corollary), for y < ŷ, families always set I = 0,
regardless of their migration choices. It follows then that migration has only an effect on
the investment behavior of families with ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1 ; in particular:
E
[
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
]− E [I|m = 0, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0
= E
[
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
]
> 0.
(13)
Equation (13) makes it explicit that migration exerts a positive effect on investment
decisions. However, notice that a key feature of the problem is the fact that intrinsic family
characteristics need to be taken into account when evaluating the effect of migration on
investment. In fact, if those characteristics are not controlled for, the measured effect of
migration on investment may turn out to be incorrect, because by simply comparing the
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average behavior of families with and without migrants, we may also be capturing the
influence of other variables that somehow correlate with migration decisions.
To make this last argument more precise, consider now the overall association between
migration and investment in the population; this results from calculating the difference,
E [I|m = 1]−E [I|m = 0]. In parallel with the empirical results, we refer to this model
as ordinary least-squares (OLS) effect. After some algebra we obtain
E [I|m = 1]− E [I|m = 0] = Pr
[
ŷ < y < RR−1
∣∣∣m = 1] · E [I ∣∣∣m = 1, ŷ < y < RR−1 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive
+
{
Pr
[
y ≥ RR−1
∣∣∣m = 1]− Pr [y ≥ RR−1 ∣∣∣m = 0]}︸ ︷︷ ︸,
negative
(14)
where Pr
[
y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 1] < Pr [y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 0] follows from the fact that the threshold-
function n˜(y) is monotonically increasing in y.
The first thing that can be observed from (14) is that it is no longer true that families
with migrants tend to invest more than families without migrants; that is, E [I|m = 1]−
E [I|m = 0] ≶ 0. Furthermore, we can also show that OLS effect is always smaller that
the FE effect. We refer to this difference as the OLS bias.
Proposition 2 The OLS bias is negative, that is:
[E (I|m = 1)− E (I|m = 0)]−[E (I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)− E (I|m = 0, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)]
< 0
(15)
Proof. Note: The following proof is conducted for the case in which ŷ ≤ 1. The proof
for the case in which ŷ > 1 is almost identical to this one, and it is available from the
authors upon request.
The expression (15) can be re-ordered as follows:
OLS bias =
[
E
(
I|m = 0, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)− E (I|m = 0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
−
[
E
(
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R− 1
)
− E (I|m = 1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
.
(16)
Recalling (13), we can observe that the first member of (16) simplifies to:
A = 0− Pr [y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 0] = −Pr [y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 0] .
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In the case of the second member of (16), we have:
B = E
(
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)− Pr ( ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
∣∣m = 1)E (I ∣∣m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)
− Pr (y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 1)
= E
(
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
) [
1− Pr ( ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
∣∣m = 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr
(
y≥ R
R−1
∣∣∣∣m=1)
− Pr (y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 1)
= −Pr (y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 1) [1− E (I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)]
Therefore, we can in the end obtain:
A−B = −Pr [y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 0]+ Pr (y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 1) [1− E (I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)]
which is always strictly negative for the combined effect of the following two properties:
1) The monotonicity of n˜(y) implies that: Pr
(
y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 0) > Pr (y ≥ R
R−1
∣∣m = 1) .
2) The fact that E
(
I|m = 1, ŷ ≤ y < R
R−1
)
< 1. This is because, among the families with
ŷ ≤ y < R/(R− 1) and send migrants, only in those cases in which the migrant manages
to find a good job (which occurs with probability ni) do families invest in the project.
The OLS bias arises because the OLS regression underestimate the effect of migration
on investment. This occurs because the family-specific level of income (yi) and the mi-
gration decision cannot be separated. In consequence, it is important to control for the
level of income yi or other family-specific characteristics to get an unambiguous effect.
3 Data
We make use of a unique new dataset available for Mexico that we consider represen-
tative of the extreme rural poor. The data was collected for administrative purposes
by the Oportunidades (ex Progresa) program.7 Thanks to retrospective information, we
7Launched in Mexico in 1997, it is a program whose main aim is to improve the process of human
capital accumulation in the poorest communities by providing conditional cash transfers on specific types
of behavior in three key areas: nutrition, health and education. Nevertheless, these households are also
targeted by other social programs.
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managed to construct a panel of households based on three surveys. In December 2006,
the Instituto Nacional de Salud Pu´blica conducted a survey8 of recipient households in
the rural localities where the Oportunidades program started in 1997 with a 10% ran-
dom sample, stratified by state. This database is then matched to another survey, the
ENCASEH (Encuesta de Caracteristicas Socioeconomicas de los Hogares), carried out
in 1997 and 1998, and to the ENCRECEH (Encuesta de Recertificacio´n de los Hogares)
carried out in 2001. This allows us to build a balanced panel database composed of three
time observations (1997, 2001 and 2006) for 4,365 households from 130 rural localities.
This constructed database includes detailed information on each beneficiary household,
including household demographics, income level and sources, education and several types
of assets. It also includes locality-level data, mainly regarding infrastructure. Given
the risk of attrition bias in our estimation, we compared the distributions between the
balanced panel of 4,365 and the unbalanced panel. The distributions of the kernel density
estimates appear to be very close to each other and this is confirmed by the results of
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests that we run on the hypothesis that the distributions of the
balanced and unbalanced panels are the same for some key variables. The null hypothesis
cannot be rejected across all tests9. In sum the dataset seems well suited for the purposes
of the paper, because it allows us to capture diverse information on households along with
the time dimension that is useful to control for the household fixed-effects.
4 The construction of an asset index
The first step in the empirical analysis is to reduce the household assets into unidimen-
sional measures. This requires either complete knowledge of the market value of each
asset owned or the construction of an asset index. Given that the prices of many assets
owned by households are often unknown or difficult to determine, we construct the as-
8Encuesta de “Re-evaluacio´n de localidades incorporadas en las primeras fases del Programa (1997-
1998).” INSP, 2006.
9Not shown but available from the authors upon request.
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set index using the methodology used by Adato et al. (2006): the household income10
is regressed on the household’s stock of assets. The household asset index is then the
household income predicted from the estimated coefficients in the first year (1997), which
are used to extrapolate to every year. The equation we estimate is of the form:
yi,t = β0 + β1x1i,t + β2x2i,t + STATEi + ei,t, (17)
where yi,t is the per-capita income by household, x1i,t is a vector of household assets we are
interested in, x2i,t is a vector of other household characteristics and STATE correspond
to state dummy variables. The asset index is then constructed as
Ai,t = βˆ1x1i,t. (18)
The asset index is standardized by the standard deviation of itself. This simplifies the
interpretation of the regression analysis results (i.e. a regression coefficient of one means
one standard deviation of the index).
We consider three asset indexes and four categories of assets:
- AP : Productive assets: owner of a truck, agricultural land, irrigated land, working
animals;
- ANP : Non-Productive (leisure) assets: ownership of radios, TV, refrigerator, gas
stove, washing machine and vehicles;
- AT : Total assets: AP and ANP ;
- Other dwelling and household characteristics such as: electricity, earth floor, roof
weak, domestic animals, own house, years of education of the household head.
We compute the asset indexes for the different periods in the panel in Table 1. The
table shows that there is a marked increase in asset accumulation for all households (HH)
10Income aggregates were created and broken down into five categories: agricultural wage employ-
ment, non-farm wage employment, self employment, transfers and other (including income from rent and
interests).
17
Figure 2: Kernel density estimates for asset indexes
during the ten-year period. In Figure 2 we present density plots for migrant and non-
migrant households for each type of asset. Overall, the figures show that there are no
considerable differences across migrant and non-migrant HHs.
5 Descriptive statistics
According to the Bank of Mexico, Mexican migrants have remitted in 1998 an amount
of income that equals approximately 1.5% of Mexican GDP. Household level surveys also
show that remittances tend to play a key role on the survival and livelihood strategies for
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Table 1: Asset Indexes, by HH migrant status
All HH HH with HH without
migrants migrants
All years
Asset Index 0.5 0.503 0.499
[0.45] [0.471] [ 0.447 ]
Non-productive Asset Index 0.418 0.422 0.417
[0.357] [0.363] [ 0.356]
Productive Asset Index 0.1 0.085 0.102
[0.198] [0.214] [0.196]
N 13,095 1,443 11,652
1997
Asset Index 0.388 0.387 0.388
[0.44] [ 0.452] [0.438]
Non-productive Asset Index 0.344 0.342 0.345
[ 0.336] [0.345] [0.335 ]
Productive Asset Index 0.037 0.027 0.038
[0.203] [0.2] [0.203]
2001
Asset Index 0.478 0.474 0.478
[0.445] [0.466] [0.442]
Non-productive Asset Index 0.391 0.387 0.392
[0.363] [0.359] [0.363]
Productive Asset Index 0.123 0.103 0.126
[0.189] [0.214] [0.185]
2006
Asset Index 0.634 0.649 0.632
[0.43] [0.457] [0.427]
Non-productive Asset Index 0.517 0.536 0.515
[0.348] [0.357] [0.346]
Productive Asset Index 0.142 0.126 0.143
[0.186] [0.214] [0.182]
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many (typically rural) poor households (Rapoport et.al., 2005). We take advantage of our
detailed panel database to describe the economic role played by remittances in the rural
poor households. The tables below present summary statistics of the variables of interest
for the balanced panel of Mexican rural households. This information is presented for the
pooled database and disaggregated for the three different periods of the panel: 1997, 2001
and 2006.
We construct a dummy variable at the household level that indicates whether the
household has at least one member who is a migrant (i.e., working in another locality,
state or abroad). In 1997, 5% of the households had a migrant member, while 3% had
a member in the US. This percentage numbers are somewhat reduced in 2001 (3% and
2%, respectively), but increase considerably in 2006 (10% and 7%, respectively). These
results show that even when we follow the same households over a long period of time (10
years), there is considerable variation in migration statistics at the household level.
Table 2: Summary statistics: migration
1997 2001 2006
Migration HH 0.05 0.03 0.10
Migration HH to the US 0.03 0.02 0.07
Number of HH 4365 4365 4365
Other summary statistics appear in Table 3. The table shows that remittances rep-
resent less than 10% of the total income in the household (0.4/7.7). Surprisingly, this
ratio is very similar for households with current member/migrants and for those without
(the reason for this is that remittances may come from past migrants). The (pooled)
average household has a household head with 3.3 years of schooling and has 1.4 male
adults in the labor force. Both schooling and labor participation increase in 2006. The
table also reports community level variables that will be used as an instrumental variable
in the next section. HH w/mig / #HH (at com.) is the proportion of households at the
community level with at least one household member being a migrant. HH w/USmig /
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#HH (at com.) represents a similar ratio but for the case when the migrant lives in the
US. As explained in the next section, the instrumental variable will work well if there is
enough variation both across levels and across type of households. A visual inspection of
the table reveals that this is indeed the case.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
HH All HH HH w/mig HH wo/mig
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
All years
Per capita inc 7.7 1.9 7.847 1.70 7.667 1.95
Remittances 0.6 3.3 1.694 8.17 0.462 1.96
Yrs educ (head) 3.362 2.079 3.977 2.23 3.271 2.45
HH male adults 1.436 1.18 1.784 1.31 1.393 1.15
#HH w/mig / #HH (at com.) 0.012 0.027 0.021 0.05 0.011 0.02
#HH w/USmig / #HH (at com.) 0.01 0.025 0.018 0.05 0.009 0.01
1997
Per Capita inc 7.289 2.536 7.424 2.275 7.272 2.566
Remittances 0.4 2.262 0.4 2.235 0.4 2.265
Yrs educ (head) 3.273 2.296 3.662 2.089 3.216 2.32
HH male adults 1.256 1.03 1.426 1.099 1.235 1.02
#HH w/mig / #HH (at com.) 0.011 0.031 0.018 0.05 0.011 0.028
#HH w/USmig / #HH (at com.) 0.008 0.026 0.015 0.05 0.008 0.021
2001
Per capita inc 7.776 1.502 7.925 1.198 7.757 1.535
Remittances 0.503 1.836 0.305 1.398 0.528 1.882
Yrs educ (head) 3.245 2.376 3.85 2.155 3.156 2.394
HH male adults 1.29 1.046 1.674 1.204 1.243 1.015
#HH w/mig / #HH (at com.) 0.008 0.021 0.015 0.049 0.007 0.013
#HH w/USmig / #HH (at com.) 0.006 0.019 0.012 0.048 0.005 0.011
2006
Per capita inc 7.997 1.503 8.193 1.334 7.972 1.521
Remittances 0.883 4.914 4.315 13.436 0.454 1.725
Yrs educ (head) 3.567 2.609 4.42 2.381 3.44 2.617
HH male adults 1.763 1.364 2.254 1.477 1.702 1.337
#HH w/mig / #HH (at com.) 0.017 0.029 0.029 0.068 0.015 0.019
#HH w/USmig / #HH (at com.) 0.014 0.027 0.026 0.067 0.013 0.016
6 Econometric analysis
Let Ait be an asset index for family i and year t. We are mostly interested in household-
specific asset dynamics, that is in Gi,t ≡ Ai,t − Ai,t−1. Let Mi,t be a variable that cap-
tures the migration-related nature of the household; Xit be household characteristics; and
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(µi + it) be an error component with household fixed-effects and idiosyncratic temporary
shocks. We consider the following equation of asset dynamics:
Gi,t = αAi,t−1 + βMi,t + δXi,t + µi + i,t (19)
We are mostly concerned with β ≡ ∂E[Gi,t|Ai,t−1,Mi,t,Xi,t−1,µi,ηt]
∂M
, which denotes the con-
ditional effect of migration on asset accumulation. We extend this analysis to a multi-
dimensional measure of assets A = {AP , ANP}, where AP denotes productive assets and
ANP non-productive assets. As argued above, the question we want to address here is the
effect of migration on the type of assets that families accumulate.
We study the effect of migration on asset accumulation using three different measures
of migration. First, we consider a dummy variable for households that declare having
at least one migrant member, Migrant HH (see Table 4). Second, we use the number
of migrants in the household, Number of Migrants by HH (see Table 5). Third, we use
remittances per capita (see Table 6). In each case, we separately study the effect migration
on: (i) total assets, (ii) productive assets, and (iii) non-productive assets.
6.1 Endogeneity issues
Several endogeneity issues need to be addressed in order to avoid potential biases in
this estimator. First, households may respond to adverse or positive shocks () changing
the number of migrants or the nature of migration (temporal vs. permanent). Second,
selection bias may occur if migrant households are intrinsically different from non-migrant
ones.11 Acosta (2006) uses migration networks and history (at the village or household
level) as instruments for migration (or remittances) postulating that these variables have
a positive impact on the opportunity to migrate but no additional impact on income,
schooling, or nutrition at home. McKenzie and Sasin (2007) argue that these instruments
are suitable to study the migration impact at the originary location as it is our case.
11Regarding the relationship between migration and self-selection, Borjas (1987, 1991) has formalized
the endogeneity of the migration decision, showing that the welfare impact of immigrants is crucially
dependent on the degree of transferability of their unobservable and observable variables, and that affects
the labour market.
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Following previous work on this subject, the IV strategy we follow uses the percentage
of migrants (to all destinations and to the US) at the community level as an instrument for
the household level decision. The Sargan test for overidentification in the following tables
has an average p-value of 0.1 for total and productive assets, and 0.4 for non-productive
assets. As a result they do not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instrumental
variable. Moreover, both instruments are significant on the first stage of the regression
with high F-values.
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Table 4: Growth of the Asset Index - Migrant Household
(1) (2) (3)
OLS FE IV-FE
ALL ASSETS
Asset Indext−1 -0.569*** -1.334*** -1.357***
(0.00986) (0.0126) (0.0154)
Migrant HH -0.140*** 0.0601 0.827***
(0.0414) (0.0455) (0.279)
HH male adults -0.0715*** 0.0836*** 0.0607***
(0.00783) (0.0128) (0.0156)
R2 0.282 0.729 0.712
Sargan Test 0.0942
First Stage F-Test 63.81
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Asset Indext−1 -0.553*** -1.349*** -1.367***
(0.00981) (0.0125) (0.0148)
Migrant HH -0.136*** 0.0596 0.689***
(0.0413) (0.0444) (0.267)
HH male adults -0.0799*** 0.0538*** 0.0347**
(0.00781) (0.0125) (0.0151)
R2 0.274 0.738 0.726
Sargan Test 0.0965
First Stage F-Test 64.87
NON PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Asset Indext−1 -0.657*** -1.491*** -1.485***
(0.0120) (0.0161) (0.0165)
Migrant HH -0.135*** -0.162*** -0.678**
(0.0467) (0.0543) (0.300)
HH male adults -0.0516*** -0.0304** -0.0113
(0.00885) (0.0150) (0.0187)
R2 0.258 0.664 0.657
Sargan Test 0.434
First Stage F-Test 75.36
Observations 8.730 8.730 8.730
Households 4.365 4.365
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See text for
variable definitions.
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6.2 Second stage
In all cases the OLS effect of migration on assets accumulation is negative and statistically
significant. However, when we include the household-level FE this effect becomes non-
significant, except for non-productive assets where it continues to display a negative sign
and significant. The fixed-effects results also show that total and productive assets may
have a positive correlation with migration. The differences between OLS and FE are in
line with those outlined before in Section 2. Comparing (13) with (14) shows that the
effect of FE should be bigger than that of OLS.
Next, we follow the IV strategy described above. Both total assets and productive as-
sets become positive and statistically significant while non-productive assets is, in general,
negative and statistically significant. A striking feature here is actually the magnitude
of the effect. The coefficient of the migrant dummy variable can be interpreted as the
change in standard deviation units of the corresponding asset. Therefore this shows that
having a migrant household increases total asset accumulation by 0.8 standard deviation
units. Moreover, one additional household migrant contributes to 0.2 total assets stan-
dard deviation units. Finally, doubling the amount of remittances per capita increases
assets by 1.2/10 of a standard deviation.
The magnitude and sign of the effect on productive assets follow closely that of total
assets. Having a migrant household increases productive asset accumulation by 0.8 stan-
dard deviation units. Moreover, one additional household migrant contributes to 0.2 total
assets standard deviation units. Finally, doubling the amount of remittances per capita
increases assets by 1/10 of a standard deviation. However, there is a negative and sta-
tistically significant effect on non-productive asset accumulation of a similar magnitude.
We consider that the negative coefficient in non-productive assets is also an interesting
result in itself. It suggests that some families with migrants reduce their spending in
non-productive asset so as to leave additional funds available for the accumulation of
productive assets. This result can in fact be related to our model in Section 2. There, we
have shown the existence of a minimum initial level of wealth that is necessary to hold in
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Table 5: Growth of the Asset Index - Number of Migrants by Household
(1) (2) (3)
OLS FE IV-FE
ALL ASSETS
Asset Indext−1 -0.569*** -1.333*** -1.357***
(0.00986) (0.0125) (0.0158)
Number of Migrants by HH -0.0290*** 0.00847 0.220***
(0.00911) (0.0101) (0.0768)
HH male adults -0.0703*** 0.0841*** 0.0510***
(0.00790) (0.0129) (0.0180)
R2 0.282 0.729 0.702
Sargan Test 0.0812
First Stage F-Test 41.93
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Asset Indext−1 -0.554*** -1.348*** -1.367***
(0.00981) (0.0124) (0.0150)
Number of Migrants by HH -0.0299*** 0.00826 0.182**
(0.00909) (0.00982) (0.0732)
HH male adults -0.0784*** 0.0543*** 0.0266
(0.00788) (0.0126) (0.0174)
R2 0.274 0.738 0.719
Sargan Test 0.0844
First Stage F-Test 42.80
NON PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Asset Indext−1 -0.657*** -1.491*** -1.483***
(0.0120) (0.0161) (0.0169)
Number of Migrants by HH -0.0211** -0.0281** -0.186**
(0.0103) (0.0120) (0.0820)
HH male adults -0.0516*** -0.0312** -0.00241
(0.00893) (0.0151) (0.0213)
R2 0.258 0.663 0.650
Sargan Test 0.480
First Stage F-Test 49.78
Observations 8.730 8.730 8.730
Households 4.365 4.365
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See text for
variable definitions.
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Table 6: Growth of the Asset Index - Remittances per capita
(1) (2) (3)
OLS FE IV
ALL ASSETS
Asset Indext−1 -0.570*** -1.334*** -1.352***
(0.00986) (0.0125) (0.0155)
Remittances per capita 0.000863 0.00849** 0.124***
(0.00341) (0.00378) (0.0447)
HH male adults -0.0750*** 0.0841*** 0.0660***
(0.00776) (0.0128) (0.0157)
R2 0.281 0.729 0.671
Sargan Test 0.117
First Stage F-Test 19.05
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Asset Indext−1 -0.554*** -1.348*** -1.362***
(0.00982) (0.0124) (0.0147)
Remittances per capita 0.000579 0.00608* 0.104**
(0.00340) (0.00369) (0.0423)
HH male adults -0.0833*** 0.0546*** 0.0390***
(0.00774) (0.0125) (0.0150)
R2 0.274 0.738 0.696
Sargan Test 0.115
First Stage F-Test 19.42
NON-PRODUCTIVE ASSETS
Asset Indext−1 -0.658*** -1.492*** -1.481***
(0.0120) (0.0161) (0.0177)
Remittances per capita -0.0122*** -0.00499 -0.104**
(0.00384) (0.00453) (0.0480)
HH male adults -0.0553*** -0.0354** -0.0163
(0.00877) (0.0149) (0.0182)
R2 0.258 0.663 0.626
Sargan Test 0.454
First Stage F-Test 21.75
Observations 8.730 8.730 8.730
Households 4.365 4.365
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See text for
variable definitions.
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order to invest. Families at the margin of y = R/(R − 1), who now choose to invest as
a consequence of the migration phenomena, may reinforce the magnitude of their project
by concomitantly reducing consumption.12
Overall the results show that migration can be seen as a long-term investment for the
household. Therefore, the income sent back home by the migrant is used to accumulate
productive assets, rather than non-productive assets. These findings appear across all the
different specifications presented in the tables.
7 Conclusion
This paper aims at explaining the link between migration and asset dynamics for a panel
of poor rural households in Mexico over the period 1997-2006. Our results suggest that
migration may be used by households as a mechanism to accelerate asset accumulation
in productive assets. The general idea is that remittances may help alleviate credit con-
straints for poor households, thus allowing them to invest in productive assets that would
be optimal under complete markets. Furthermore, our estimations also suggest that fam-
ilies who send migrants with the intention to channel remittances towards investment
in productive assets, concomitantly reduce their accumulation of non-productive assets,
possibly to further contribute to raising funds for physical investment.
An important caveat concerning our analysis is that it has abstracted from general
equilibrium interactions, so as to focus exclusively on the direct effect of migration on
capital accumulation via remittances. One specific general equilibrium effect that may
be particularly relevant in our context is the fact that migration decisions will necessarily
affect the aggregate labor supply at the home village. On the one hand, migration lowers
aggregate labor supply at the village level, which in turn would raise equilibrium wages
and household incomes (see Jaimovich (2010) for a growth model where this mechanism
12Strictly speaking, this does not occur in our (highly) stylized model because we assume that υ ≥ 1 [see
equation (8)] together with a fixed level of investment. However, letting υ > 0 would straightforwardly
lead to the result that households at the margin of y = R/(R−1) will reduce consumption to help raising
funds for investment, when the migrant finds a good job and 0 < υ < 1.
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is at play). However, looking at the household level, sending out a migrant also means
losing one of their workers (and, possibly, the most productive worker). Furthermore, it
may well be the case that the wealth effect brought about by the migrant leads household
members who remain at the village to increase their leisure consumption. In that regard,
two remarks apply here. First, although we acknowledge that these effects imply that
migration may influence accumulation also by other channels other than remittances, we
are agnostic concerning the overall sign of these additional effects. Second, the above
general equilibrium effect on the wage, which could be expected to induce an upwards
bias on the effect of remittances, will be of significant magnitude only if the total number
of migrants from the rural village varies substantially across our years of observations.
In that respect, the results in Table 2 are not so discouraging, as they tell us that the
percentage of families with at least one migrant ranges within 3% to 10% of the sampled
households.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Step 1: Let yi ∈
[
R
R−1 , y
]
and define:
n˜1(yi) ≡ M
ln (yi + υ − 1)− ln (yi − 1) . (20)
Notice first that n˜1(yi) > 0 and finite, since both the numerator and denominator in (20)
are strictly positive and finite. Secondly, differentiating (20) with respect to yi yields:
dn˜1
dyi
=
M
[ln (yi + υ − 1)− ln (yi − 1)]2
(
1
yi − 1 −
1
yi + υ − 1
)
> 0,
where the result n˜
′
1(yi) > 0 follows from the fact that yi − 1 < yi + υ − 1. Finally, since
the left-hand side in (7) is strictly increasing in ni, it immediately follows that for any
ni > n˜1(yi) condition (7) holds.
Step 2: Let yi ≥ 1 and yi ∈
(
ŷ, R
R−1
)
and define:
n˜2(yi) ≡ M
ln (yi + υ − 1) + ln(yi +R)− ln (y2i )
. (21)
Firstly, n˜2(yi) > 0 and finite, because both the numerator and denominator in (21) are
strictly positive and finite. Secondly, differentiating (21) with respect to yi yields:
dn˜2
dyi
=
M
[ln (yi + υ − 1) + ln(yi +R)− ln (y2i )]2
(
2
yi
− 2yi +R + 2(υ − 1)
y2i +R(yi − 1) + yi(υ − 1) + υR
)
> 0,
(22)
where n˜
′
2(yi) > 0 obtains after some algebra on the second term in right-hand side of (22),
which leads to the condition that n˜
′
2(yi) > 0 iff yi(R − 1) + yiυ + 2R(υ − 1) > 0. Lastly,
since the left-hand side in (11) is strictly increasing in ni, it immediately follows that for
any ni > n˜2(yi) condition (11) prevails.
Step 3: Let yi ≥ 1 and yi ≤ ŷ and define:
n˜3(yi) ≡ M
ln
(
yi +
υ
2
)2 − ln (y2i ) . (23)
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As in the previous two cases, n˜3(yi) > 0 and finite, as both the numerator and denominator
in (23) are strictly positive and finite. Next, differentiating (23) with respect to yi yields:
dn˜3
dyi
=
M[
ln
(
yi +
υ
2
)2 − ln (y2i )]2
(
2
yi
− 2yi + υ
y2i +
υ2
4
+ yiυ
)
> 0, (24)
where n˜
′
3(yi) > 0 obtains after some algebra on the second term in right-hand side of (24),
which leads to the condition that n˜
′
3(yi) > 0 iff
υ2
2
+ yiυ > 0. Finally, since the left-hand
side in (12) is strictly increasing in ni, it trivially follows that for any ni > n˜3(yi) condition
(12) holds.
Step 4: Let now,
n˜(yi) =

n˜1(yi) if
R
R−1 ≤ yi ≤ y,
n˜2(yi) if yi ≥ 1 and ŷ < yi < RR−1 ,
n˜3(yi) if yi ≥ 1 and yi ≤ ŷ.
Replacing yi =
R
R−1 into (20) and (21), we can observe after some simple algebra that
n˜1
(
R
R−1
)
= n˜2
(
R
R−1
)
. Similarly, from the definition of ŷ in (10), replacing yi = ŷ into (21)
and (23), it follows that n˜2 (ŷ) = n˜3 (ŷ). As a consequence, it follows that n˜(yi) portrays
a continuous and strictly increasing function and n˜(yi) : R++ → R++.
Step 5: Finally, to prove that n˜
(
R
R−1
)
< 1, notice that plugging yi =
R
R−1 into (20) leads
to:
n˜1
(
R
R−1
)
=
M
ln
(
1
R−1 + υ
)− ln ( 1
R−1
) = M
ln
(
1+υ(R−1)
R−1
1
R−1
) = M
ln [1 + υ(R− 1)] .
Therefore, n˜1
(
R
R−1
)
< 1 iff M < ln [1 + υ(R− 1)], which is guaranteed by M ≤ ln(R)
together with υ ≥ 1 and R > 1. 
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